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THE SCOPE OF SUPREME COURT REVIEW
IN OBSCENITY CASES
IN Roth v. United States, the United States Supreme Court held
that the test for obscenity is "whether to the average person, apply-
ing contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the
material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest."1 Material
that met this test was excluded from the realm of constitutionally
protected expression, since it was "utterly without redeeming social
importance" and, therefore, could contribute nothing to the free
exchange of ideas. 2 Nevertheless, the Roth case has left unresolved
the meaning of "community" 3 and the scope of judicial review ac-
corded by the Supreme Court to convictions under state and local
obscenity statutes. In Jacobellis v. Ohio,4 where the manager of a
movie theater was convicted under an Ohio statute6 for showing
Les Amants, these issues were considered when the Court was un-
able to muster a majority to join in an opinion.
Justices Brennan and Goldberg asserted that it was the manda-
tory duty of the Court in each case to review de novo the evidentiary
basis for the finding of obscenity,7 and then to apply the Roth test,
1354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).21d. at 484. For discussions of the Roth test, see Henkin, Morals and the Constitu-
tion: the Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L. Rv. 391 (1963); Kalven, The Metaphysics
of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup. CT. Rxv. 1; Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of
Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. Rav. 5 (1960).
-'There is no explicit discussion in Roth of the significance of "community." How-
ever, in Jacobellis v. Ohio, Mr. Justice Brennan, the author of the opinion of the
court in Roth, stated that he and Justice Goldberg "reaffirm the position taken in
Roth to the effect that the constitutional status of an allegedly obscene work must
be determined on the basis of a national standard." 378 U.S. 184, 195 (1964). (Em-
phasis added.)
'378 U.S. 184 (1964). Jacobellis is the first case involving the application of a
state obscenity statute in which the Supreme Court has rendered a judgment accom-
panied by opinions. In Albert v. California, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), the companion case
decided with Roth, the issue was the constitutionality of the statute in light of the
admitted obscenity of the material. Although Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959)
involved the application of a statute, this issue was never reached; the case turned
upon the unconstitutionality of the statute for lack of any requirement of scienter.
Another case involving the application of a state statute to the challenged material,
Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 355 U.S. 371 (1957), was simply reversed per
curiam.
" 173 Ohio St. 22, 179 N.E.2d 777 (1962), affirming 115 Ohio App. 226, 175 N.E.2d
123 (1961).
OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2905.34 (Supp. 1964).
378 U.S. at 187-90. Although there was no opinion of the court, the Brennan-
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construing "community" as the nation at large.8 Justices Black and
Douglas concurred in the judgment on the broader ground that any
obscenity law abridges the freedom of expression guaranteed by
the first and fourteenth amendments. 9 Mr. Justice Stewart's concur-
rence was predicated on his belief that Les A mants did not represent
the "hard-core poronography" which alone can be constitutionally
banned.10 Mr. Justice White concurred without opinion.
The Chief Justice, joined by Mr. Justice Clark, dissented, argu-
ing in favor of a "sufficient evidence" review.1 Feeling that Jaco-
bellis' conviction was supported by the requisite evidence, they
would have affirmed. Mr. Justice Harlan dissented on the ground
that the Court should reverse state obscenity convictions only when
such convictions are "irrational"; having viewed Les Amants, he felt
that Jacobellis' conviction could not be so characterized.12
THE BRENNAN-GOLDBERG VIEW: DE Novo
REvIEW AND A NATIONAL "COMMUNITY"
According to Justices Brennan and Goldberg, the duty to under-
take a de novo review arises from the Court's decision in Roth,
under which any finding of obscenity necessarily entails a judgment
that the challenged material is not constitutionally protected. 3
Goldberg language has been referred to as the "holding" in Jacobellis. See People v.
Bruce, 202 N.E.2d 497, 498 (IIl. 1964).
8 378 U.S. at 192-95.
'Id. at 196. Justices Black and Douglas have frequently stated that freedom of
expression cannot be abridged merely by reference to the thoughts to which a
particular material might give rise. In their view, dissemination and "consumption"
of obscene material can be regulated only if it can be proven to have resulted in
antisocial conduct which is a proper subject of governmental control. See Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. at 509 (dissenting opinion).
10 Mr. Justice Stewart admitted that he would not attempt, and perhaps could
not define hard-core pornography. He merely stated: "I know it when I see it, and
the motion picture involved in this case is not that." 378 U.S. at 197.
11 Id. at 202-03.
12 Id. at 203-04. Mr. Justice Harlan is quicker to reverse a conviction under a
federal obscenity statute since he feels that obscenity is primarily an issue reserved
to the states and, therefore, an area of merely attenuated federal interest. Thus he
dissented in Roth, 354 U.S. at 503, while he concurred in the companion case. Id.
at 500. This dual standard is reflective of a danger envisioned by Justice Harlan in
federal censorship. Federal prohibition of the use of the facilities of interstate com-
merce for the dissemination of material can effectively deprive the whole country
of access to the material. If merely one state bans certain material it may still be
available in other states. See Manuel Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 488
(1962) (Harlan, J.). Moreover, this dualism is a projection of Harlan's theory that
the strength of our federal system lies in the diversity and incongruity between the
states comprising the system, each state being one of "forty-eight experimental social
laboratories." 354 U.S. at 505.
18 378 U.S. at 188.
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Under Roth, a determination of obscenity is no mere finding of
fact, but a "constitutional judgment" which cannot be left exclu-
sively to the trier-of-fact or a state's appellate courts. 14 The Court's
responsibility in obscenity cases is the same as in other cases in-
volving state court "constitutional judgments" under the due process
clause.15 This is especially true in first amendment cases,1 as evi-
denced by the Court's willingness to review a record de novo for
purposes of determining whether conduct has in fact constituted:
a breach of the peace or unlawful assembly; 17 a clear and present
danger to the impartial administration of justice;18 incitement to
insurrection; 9 or publication with actual malice.20
Arguing that the application of rights guaranteed by the federal
constitution should not vary from state to state, much less from
community to community,21 Justices Brennan and Goldberg con-
strued the term "community" in the Roth test in a national sense,
as signifying "society at large; ... the public, or people in general., 22
They supported their construction by recalling that Judge Learned
Hand, who coined the phrase "contemporary community standards"
in obscenity litigation, used it in a temporal and not a geographic
14 See Zeitlin v. Arnebergh, 59 Cal. 2d 901, 909-10, 383 P.2d 152, 157-58, 31 Cal.
Rptr. 800, 805-06 (1963); Attorney General v. Book Named "Tropic of Cancer," 345
Mass. 11, 13, 184 N.E.2d 828, 329-30 (1962); People v. Richmond County News, Inc.,
9 N.Y.2d 578, 580-81, 175 N.E.2d 681, 682, 216 N.Y.S.2d 369, 370 (1961).1 E.g., Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 51 (1949); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587,
590 (1935).
18 "[W]e reject, in this case, the argument that there is greater latitude for state
action under the word 'liberty' under the Fourteenth Amendment than is allowed
to Congress by the language of the First Amendment." Roth v. United States, 354
US. at 492 n.31.
17 Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963); Feiner v. New York, 340
U.S. 315, 316 (1951); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 271 (1951).
18 Craig v. Harney, 31 U.S. 367, 373 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331,
335 (1946); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 271 (1941).
29 Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 247 (1947).
20 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285 (1964).
211378 U.S. at 194-95.
22 378 U.S. at 193 (quoting WEBSTER, NEW INTERNATIONAL DICToNARY 542 (2d ed.
1949)); see note 3 supra. Justices Brennan and Goldberg also alluded to a factor
-which Justice Harlan in Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 482 (1962)
considered to be a condition precedent to any consideration of the issue of obscenity
-that is, whether the challenged material exceeds the limits of candor of the com-
munity. They construed the Roth standard to include this factor since it was included
in the definition of obscenity in the Model Penal Code of the American Law
Institute, which was favorably mentioned in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. at 487
n.20. 378 U.S. at 191-92. Furthermore, Brennan and Goldberg emphasized that the
social importance of the challenged material is not to be weighed against its "offen-
siveness." To be obscene the material must be utterly without redeeming social
importance. Id. at 191.
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sense.23 Variant local standards of obscenity would, in their view,
entail the intolerable consequence of depriving some segments of
the nation of access to material there deemed acceptable.24 For ex-
ample, a residential suburban community might depend entirely
upon the motion-picture theater and library "in town" for access
to such forms of expression. Were the "town" considered the
relevant community by whose standards an obscenity prosecution
would be tried, the suburban community, if broader in outlook,
might be deprived of ready access to forms of expression which by
its own standards would be constitutionally permissible.25 More-
over, the restrictive standards of a single community might induce
national disseminators to by-pass an entire state rather than risk
costly involvement in obscenity litigation. 2 Should national dis-
seminators feel compelled to distribute within a particular state only
material conforming to the standards of its most conventional com-
munities, the result would be an indirect system of distributor
censorship 27
THE WARREN-CLARK VIEW: SUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE AND A LOCAL "COMMUNITY"
While failing to challenge directly the view that a finding of
obscenity under Roth necessarily entails a "constitutional judg-
ment," the Chief Justice and Justice Clark take issue with the Bren-
nan-Goldberg concept of the Court's proper role in obscenity litiga-
tion.28 The crux of their dissent is a feeling of disappointment and
frustration at the inability of the Court to provide workable guide-
23 See United States v. Kennerley, 209 Fed. 119, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1913) (cited in 378
U.S. at 192-93).
2, Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 488 (Harlan, J.).
2rThe textual example also illustrates the problem of drawing community lines.
The term "community" need not signify a geo-political subdivision. Whereas in
Jacobellis, the defendant is prosecuted under a state obscenity statute, the "corm-
munity" might reasonably be held to be the entire state of Ohio. However, if the
jury sitting in Cuyahoga County was applying the "contemporary community stan-
dards" of the state of Ohio, it seems anomalous that the film was shown without
incident in other cities of the state. See 378 U.S. at 196.
20 In Jacobellis, for example, an Ohio statute, and not a Cleveland Heights ordi-
nance, was involved. The statute was construed and applied by the Supreme Court
of Ohio. Prior to this litigation the film had been shown in other major Ohio, cities
without incident. It is questionable whether following Jacobellis' conviction a dis-
siminator would chance a showing of Les Amants or a comparable film within the state.
27 Cf. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
28 Warren and Clark neither challenge nor attempt to distinguish the analogous
cases cited by Justices Brennan and Goldberg as indicating a duty of de novo review.
See notes 14-20 supra.
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lines in obscenity cases which, they note with consternation, have
proliferated since Roth.29 By granting de novo review in each case,
the Court establishes itself as an "ultimate censor," at once depriv-
ing local communities of the right to protect their "moral fiber"
according to their own standards and impeding effective administra-
tion of justice by unproductive consumption of the Court's limited
time 0
Warren and Clark purport to find the solution to these prob-
lems in limiting the Surpreme Court to a "sufficient evidence" re-
view. However, they fail to indicate what type and quantum of
evidence would meet such a standard. The "sufficient evidence"
requirement is described as "something more than merely any evi-
dence," but something less than the "substantial evidence" require-
ment of Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,3 1 under which the lower
courts were admonished to balance both sides of the record in
deciding whether the evidence supported the decision. Whether the
"sufficient evidence" standard entails perusal of only one side of
the record does not appear in the Chief Justice's opinion.
82
The Warren-Clark advocacy of a "sufficient evidence" review is
apparently premised on a feeling that the local community can
2 378 US. at 199-200.
301d. at 202.
a' 340 U.S. 474 (1951) (cited in 378 U.S. at 203).
32The Chief Justice's definition of sufficient evidence was "something less than
substantial evidence on the record (including the allegedly obscene material) as a
whole." 378 US. at 203. The parenthetical does nothing to indicate whether the
Warren-Clark view contemplates reading or viewing the material, merely glancing
at it, or completely disregarding it. Looking at only one side of the record would
seem the most obvious difference between "sufficient evidence" and the "substantial
evidence" requirement of Universal Camera. Nevertheless, the definition leaves room
for at least three other standards of judicial review. (1) Look to both sides of the
record, including the challenged material, and affirm if the conviction is at least
arguably correct. One problem inherent in this interpretation is that it requires
reading or viewing the challenged material and hence consumes as much time as
de novo review. Moreover, it is difficult to see any real difference between this and
the scope of review required in Universal Camera; both would require affirming a
judgment which, after considering the record as a whole, is supported by the evi-
dence. (2) Look to both sides of the record, merely glancing at the objectionable
'material, and affirm if the conviction is at least arguably correct. A superficial perusal
of the material, however, would seem to accentuate the more objectionable aspects
while obscuring the "dominant theme." Compare note 51 infra. (3) Look to both
sides of the record, disregarding the challenged material, and affirm if the convic-
tion is at least arguably correct. If this is the test, disregarding the material may
leave no record to review in those states which apply the ultimate facts rule of
evidence. See text accompanying notes 33-40 infra. Furthermore, the constitutional
claim on which review is sought in obscenity cases is that a statute or ordinance has
been unconstitutionally applied, and it is difficult to see how the Court could review
a determination that material is in fact obscene without looking at the material.
[Vol. 1965:596
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properly judge the challenged material by its own standards. They
believe "that there is no provable national standard and perhaps
there should be none."33 Indeed, if "community" be given a local
significance, the local trier-of-fact is best qualified to determine how
the average person would apply community standards in judging
the appeal of the dominant theme of the challenged material taken
as a whole. Compared to a local jury, the Supreme Court is mani-
festly incompetent to ascertain and apply local community standards.
THE FcoRD IN OBSCENITY CAsEs
The record presented to a reviewing court in most obscenity
cases consists primarily of undisputed primary facts.3 4 Furthermore,
it has been held that the state satisfies its burden of going forward
merely by offering evidence that the defendant knowingly35 dissemi-
nated the challenged material and by placing the material in evi-
dence as an exhibit.38 The state need proffer no evidence as to the
dominant theme of the material, 7 nor of contemporary community
standards; both have been considered legal conclusions or "ultimate
22 378 U.S. at 200-01.
"The "speech" in question and the fact of its dissemination is generally admitted.
See Lockhart & McClure, supra note 2, at 116.
25The Supreme Court in Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959), held that a
statute making the dissemination of obscenity a crime is unconstitutional unless the
element of scienter is included. It left undetermined the kind of mens rea that is
constitutionally necessary since the statute in question was completely devoid of
scienter and imposed an absolute criminal liability.
A related danger, peculiar to the area of first amendment freedoms, arises where,
due to a lack of definitive legal standards, the subsequent punishment meted out
takes the form of a "prior restraint." If the definition of constitutionally protected
material is vague, the individual may be induced to temper his speech to a greater
degree than is constitutionally necessary. This is both a tacit form of inhibition
of individual freedoms and a deprivation of public access to constitutionally pro-
tected expression. The range of permissible subsequent punishment in the first
amendment field should be so circumscribed as to provide adequate latitude for the
exercise of guaranteed expression, and this cannot be accomplished by merely re-
quiring that the range of subsequent punishment be explicit enough to satisfy the
notice requirements of due process. Although this may be adequate protection of
individual freedoms, it dilutes public access to constitutionally protected speech by
imposing self-censorship on those prospective speakers who fear the danger of sub-
sequent punishment.
86 See City of Chicago v. Kimmel, 201 N.E.2d 386, 388 (Ill. 1964); City of Chicago
v. Doe, 47 Ill. App. 2d 460, 466-67, 197 N.E.2d 711, 714 (Ill. 1964); Yudkin v. State,
229 Md. 223, 227, 182 A.2d 799, 800-01 (1962). A similar case arising under a federal
statute is Kahm v. United States, 300 F.2d 78, 84 (5th Cir. 1962).




facts" within the exclusive province of the jury.a8 State evidence
on the appeal of the material to prurient interests is unnecessary
since this issue is autoptically handled by the jury, 9 as well as being
a legal conclusion.40
Courts seem especially reluctant to admit purportedly expert
testimony on the above matters, since these issues are so peculiarly
within the competence of the local jury.41 Even assuming such
testimony is admissible, the expert must first establish his qualifica-
tions, and it is difficult to qualify as an expert on "contemporary
community standards."42 Some courts will permit the defendant to
establish by expert testimony that the challenged material did not
exceed the community limits of candor by showing that similar ma-
terial was prevalent and tolerated in the community. 8 If testimony
as to the similarity of the challenged material to that alleged to be
tolerated by the community were not admitted, under the Roth
"material-as-a-whole" requirement, the jury would have to spend
valuable court time considering as a whole each exhibit claimed to
be comparable." Moreover, defendants are universally permitted
8 See cases cited note 36 supra. See generally 7 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 1920 (3d
ed. 1940) (critical of ultimate fact rule).
The Roth requirement of judging the material as a whole gives rise to the evi-
dentiary problem of presenting the material to the jury. It has been unsuccessfully
argued that the book as a whole must be read aloud to the jury. See Alexander v.
United States, 271 F.2d 140, 144-45 (8th Cir. 1959); United States v. West Coast News
Co., supra note 37, at 178-79. Two alternatives are presented: the exhibits can be taken
into the juryroom to be perused by the jury during their deliberation, Alexander v.
United States, supra, or they can be given to the jury for perusal in open court at
the dose of the state's case, United States v. West Coast News Co., supra; see Yudkin
v. State, 229 Md. 223, 225, 182 A.2d 798, 800 (1962). Although more time consuming
for the court, the latter alternative is the preferred view since it is more certain
that the jury will in fact peruse the material and it renders the defendant's case
more comprehensible. See United States v. West Coast News Co., supra at 179.
80 City of Chicago v. Doe, 197 N.E.2d 711, 714 (Ill. 1964). Professor Wigmore
classifies all evidential sources as testimonial, circumstantial, and autoptical. The
latter is a fact which is offered for direct perception without depending upon a
conscious inference from other testimonial or circumstantial facts. IVIGaonE, CODE
OF EVIDENCE § 200, at 42, § 201, at 44 (3d ed. 1942).40 See G. P. Putnam's Sons v. Callisi, 205 A.2d 913, 920 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1964).
41 See United States v. West Coast News Co., 228 F. Supp. 171, 182-91 (W.D. Mich.
1964); Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 557-61, 62 N.E.2d 840, 848-49 (1945).
If the Brennan-Goldberg position that "community" is to be given a national signifi-
cance is adopted by a majority of the Court, this might facilitate the introduction of
expert testimony because national community standards would not necessarily be
within the peculiar competence of the local jury.
42 See Yudkin v. State, 229 Md. 223, 228-29, 182 A.2d 798, 801-02 (1962); United
States v. West Coast News Co., supra note 41, at 182-83.
Is See In re Harris, 56 Cal. 2d 879, 880, 366 P.2d 305, 305-06, 16 Cal. Rptr. 889, 889-
90 (1961); Yudkin v. State, supra note 42, at 227-28, 182 A.2d at 801-02.
"1 See note 38 supra.
[Vol. 1965:596
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
to present evidence as to the "redeeming social importance" of the
challenged material, since this is an issue not peculiarly within the
jury's competence; it is therefore an issue concerning which expert
testimony might be of assistance.45
THE FEAsIBILITY OF THE WARREN-CLARK VIEW
Given this type of record, it is difficult to imagine how a review-
ing court would apply a mere "sufficient evidence" review. If some-
thing less than the "substantial evidence" test of Universal Camera
means looking only at one side of the record,46 then nothing more
than the defendant's knowing dissemination of the challenged ma-
terial could be gleaned from the state's case. If this constitutes
insufficient evidence, then the Court would be compelling states to
alter their rules of evidence.40 7 If, on the other hand this in itself
amounts to "sufficient evidence," it would seem that the test advo-
cated by Warren and Clark is merely a subtle device for obviating
protracted consideration of obscenity cases by the Court.48 The fact
that the state bears the burden of persuasion in criminal prosecu-
tions may well induce presentation of more evidence than is neces-
sary to sustain merely its burden of going forward. Yet so long as
an obscenity case can go to the jury on a mere showing that the
defendant knowingly disseminated the challenged material, 49 review-
ing courts may be faced with the difficult and perhaps meaningless
task of applying a "sufficient evidence" test to a virtually barren
record.r0
Aside from the prospect that the test may not be susceptible to
a meaningful Supreme Court review, the solicitude for a local com-
15 See, e.g., Attorney General v. Book Named "Tropic of Cancer," 345 Mass. 11,
20-21, 184 N.E.2d 328, 334-35 (1962).
"0 See text accompanying note 31 supra.
17 See notes 37-40 supra and accompanying text.
"8 That this objective lies at the base of the Warren-Clark advocacy of a "sufficient
evidence" review is suggested by their votes against granting certiorari in two subse-
quent cases. Tralins v. Gerstein, 378 U.S. 576 (1964) (reversing per curiam); Grove
Press, Inc. v. Gerstein, 378 U.S. 577 (1964) (reversing per curiam).
"D See cases cited note 36 supra. The challenged material, of course, must be placed
in evidence as an exhibit and submitted to the jury for consideration. See text in note
39 supra.
1o If the reason given for allowing the state to go to the jury without presenting
evidence on "community standards," "dominant theme," and "appeal" is that these
are legal conclusions, it is questionable whether the state could present evidence on
these issues even if it chose to do so. If evidence on these issues is precluded, the
case against the "sufficient evidence" test is even stronger, since it would be impossible
for the record to contain anything more than the defendant's knowing dissemination
of the material, the material itself, and evidence as to its redeeming social importance.
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munity standard by Justices Warren and Clark does lend some
validity to a "sufficient evidence" test. But even if it be conceded
that "community" should be given a local significance, a sufficient
evidence test might be obviated by other considerations. Although
the Supreme Court would seem incompetent to review a state court
determination of the appeal of the material according to local com-
munity standards, it would be competent to review a determination
of "the dominant theme of the material as a whole."5' Such a
determination does not depend upon "contemporary community
standards," for under Roth only the appeal of the dominant theme
of the material as a whole is to be judged according to community
norms5 2 Moreover, were the jury to misjudge the dominant theme,
it would probably also misconceive both the appeal of the material
and its social importance. 5 The Supreme Court could hold that
the dominant theme could not appeal to prurient interest under
any community standards. To determine the dominant theme of
the challenged material, the Court itself would have to peruse the
material since the prevalent rules of evidence tend to preclude any
testimony on this issue from appearing in the record."
However, if local standards are emphasized it might be irrele-
vant that a single theme were found to be "dominant." It could
be argued that the members of the local community may be so un-
sophisticated as to miss the "dominant theme" and detect only a
theme that appeals to prurient interest. If a local trier-of-fact would
so find, it follows that the community's right to protect its "moral
fiber" would suffice to sustain the prohibition of the challenged
material.55 Were "dominant theme" interpreted as "dominant theme
511Roth adopted "dominant theme" as a part of the constitutionally acceptable
definition of obscenity since, "The Hicklin test, judging obscenity by the effect of
isolated passages upon the most susceptible persons, might well encompass material
legitimately treating with sex, and so it must be rejected as unconstitutionally
restrictive of the freedoms of speech and press." 354 U.S. at 489. The Court expressed
the opinion that it is "vital that the standards for judging obscenity safeguard the
protection of freedom of speech and press for material which does not treat sex in a
manner appealing to prurient interest." Id. at 488.
52 See text accompanying note 1 supra.
58 For example, if the dominant theme is found to be a portrayal of eroticism in
post-war France, the appeal of the material is more likely to be found to be directed
to prurient interest, and the material to be lacking in social importance, than if the
dominant theme were held to be a protest against war by means of a showing of the
moral decay wrought by war. But see Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity:
The Developing Constitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REv. 5, 72-73 (1960).
-5 See text accompanying notes 9-11 supra.
5 This view assumes that the dissemination of obscene material poses a threat to
the moral fiber of the community. This was an issue in United States v. Roth, 237
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as conceived by the local community," the Supreme Court vis-4-vis
a local jury would be as incompetent to discern the "dominant
theme" as it would be to ascertain "community" standards. Hence,
under this view a sufficient evidence test might still be feasible.
Nevertheless, even if a local significance is accorded "communi-
ty" and "dominant theme," de novo review by the Supreme Court
might still be necessary on the issue of "redeeming social impor-
tance." In Roth, the Court upheld the constitutionality of obscenity
statutes on the ground that the obscene is "worthless"-"utterly
without redeeming social importance"-and therefore not entitled
to constitutional protection.56 This language may be fairly con-
strued to mean that material must be worthless to satisfy the consti-
tutional standards relating to obscenity; 57 therefore, material whose
dominant theme appeals to prurient interest may not be ipso facto
proscribable since it may not be "utterly without redeeming social
importance."53 The highest courts of California,59 Illinois,60 Massa-
F.2d 796, 798 (2d Cir. 1956). On appeal, the Supreme Court sidestepped the issue by
holding that since obscene material is not constitutionally protected, issues relating to
the clear and present danger test need not be considered. The lower court, however,
was troubled by the fact that "no one can show that, with any reasonable probability
obscene publications tend to have any effects on the behavior of normal, average
adults ...." Id. at 802 (concurring opinion). For this reason, Justices Warren and
Clark cannot base their argument on the unsubstantiated conclusion that the obscene
presents a danger to the community, unless they are willing to subscribe to Justice
Harlan's argument that state legislatures have discretion to act unless the choice is
"irrational." See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. at 501-02 (concurring in part, dis-
senting in part).
"0 354 U.S. at 481-85.
'7 See Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup. CT. R.v. 1, 13.
" On the other hand, it may be argued that "utterly without redeeming social
importance" is merely a shorthand expression for "material whose dominant theme
appeals to prurient interest." Under this approach, all that is obscene is worthless,
obscenity is that which appeals to prurient interest, therefore, things whose dominant
theme appeals to prurient interest are worthless. This, however, is fallidous reasoning.
In logical terminology, this is generally known as the fallacy of illicit distribution and
specifically as the fallacy of the illicit minor premise. See, e.g., Ruby, Looic 185-86
(1960). It is equivalent to saying that all lawyers are educated people, all lawyers
are talkative people, therefore, all talkative people are educated people.
" California amended its obscenity statute, which was phrased in terms of the Roth
test, by adding "and is matter which is utterly without redeeming social importance."
CAL. PEN. CODE § 311 (Supp. 1964). (Emphasis added.) In construing this statute,
the court in Zeitlin v. Arnebergh, 59 Cal. 2d 901, 383 P.2d 152, 31 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1963)
indicated that this amendment made an element of the offense that which was
formerly described as a defense. Id. at 918-20, 383 P.2d at 164, 31 Cal. Rptr. at 812.
00 In People v. Bruce, 202 N.E.2d 497 (Ill. 1964), the court reversed an obscenity
conviction despite its feeling that the material was patently offensive and that it
transgressed customary limits of candor. The court stated that "no matter how
objectionable the method of its presentation . . [the material] was constitutionally
privileged unless it was utterly without redeeming social importance." Id. at 498.
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chusetts,61 and New York 2 have read Roth and subsequent per
curiam decisions 3 as indicating this to be the case. Under this
view, the application of a sufficient evidence test to judge "com-
munity standards" and "dominant theme" would not preclude de
novo review of the material by the Court for purposes of evaluating
"redeeming social importance."6 4
In any event, it is doubtful that a "sufficient evidence" review
would in the long run reduce the amount of time which the Court
spends in reviewing obscenity cases.63 Certainly the amount of time
spent reviewing any particular case would be reduced. However,
a "'sufficient evidence" affirmance would have little value with re-
gard to defining the constitutional protection to be afforded the
same material. Petitioners from hundreds of other "communities,"
or even the same "community," might well seek review of the same
material under the belief that their evidence is sufficient to overturn
their conviction. This would be particularly true if a local com-
munity standard is adopted, and the Supreme Court would have to
reevaluate the meaning of "contemporary community standards" in
every case. On the other hand, a ruling following de novo review,
which entails an independent perusal of the challenged material,
would tend to discourage petitioners from seeking review of the
same material.
A definitive ruling on the material itself, furthermore, might
prevent a great many cases from coming to the Court at all, since
a'in Attorney General v. Book Named "Tropic of Cancer," 345 Mass. 11, 20-21,
184 N.E.2d 328, 34-85 (1962), the court held that obscenity in the constitutional sense
is that which lacks redeeming social significance. By negative implication, it may be
argued that material cannot be constitutionally proscribed as obscene and yet possess
redeeming social significance.
62 People v. Richmond County News, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 578, 589, 175 N.E.2d 681, 687,
216 N.Y.S.2d 867, 378 (1961) (concurring opinion). See id. at 586-87, 175 N.E.2d at
685-86, 216 N.Y.S.2d at 375-76.
68 Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U.S. 72 (1957); One, Inc. v. Olesen, 855
US. 871 (1957); Times Fill Corp. v. City of Chicago, 855 US. 85 (1957).
e' One could argue that under the Warren-Clark philosophy "redeeming social
importance" should logically be given a local significance, "social" referring to the
local community.
65This would be particularly true if "sufficient evidence requires reading or
viewing the entire material. See note 82 supra.
It appears that the Warren-Clark dissent was motivated primarily by distaste for
the prospect of the Supreme Court acting as the ultimate censor for the United States
in all obscenity cases. It is probably this concern which has compelled them to
adopt the local community and sufficient evidence standards, which are admittedly
intended to vest primary responsibility for administering the law of obscenity in the
hands of local tribunals. See 378 U.S. at 199-200, 202-03.
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state appellate courts might, by analogy to materials already held to
be constitutionally protected by the Supreme Court, reverse the
conviction. Moreover, utilization of this analogy reasoning might
force local prosecutors to be more selective in the indicting process.
Since the concept of obscenity is not conducive to definitive legal
standards, it can be argued that the Supreme Court can best guide
other tribunals by creating a series of precedents upon which state
and lower federal courts may reason from analogy.6
CONCLUSION
On balance, the Warren-Clark alternative to de novo review in
obscenity cases does not seem feasible. The rules of evidence which
have evolved in this area would appear to render a "sufficient evi-
dence" test meaningless. Even assuming its workability, such a test
would seem an ineffective and short-sighted attempt to better ad-
minister the Court's business. It is also questionable whether the
theoretical basis of the Warren-Clark approach, which accords a
local significance to "community," would preempt the Court from
undertaking a de novo review of the evidentiary basis of a "constitu-
tional judgment" in light of the remaining issues of "dominant
theme" and "redeeming social importance." 67 Hence, unless the
Court is willing to take the unlikely step of adopting the Black-
Douglas view that all obscenity laws abridge freedom of expression
and are therefore unconstitutional, it would appear that de novo
review is in order.68
00 See Larkin v. G. P. Putnam's Sons, 14 N.Y.2d 304, 252 N.Y.S.2d 71, 200 N.E.2d
760 (1964). There the court noted that the United States Supreme Court had over-
ruled convictions involving Tropic of Cancer and Pleasure Was My Business; since it
did not consider Fanny Hill to be any worse than the books already accorded constitu-
tional protection, it refused to affirm an order restraining the sale and distribution of
Fanny Hill. Contra, G. P. Putnam's Sons v. Callisi, 86 NJ. Super. 82, 205 A.2d 913
(1964) (rejecting the analogy test).
07 It should be noted that since the decision in Roth, the Supreme Court has failed
to uphold a single obscenity conviction. See Tralins v. Gerstein, 378 U.S. 576 (1964)
(per curiam); Grove Press, Inc. v. Gerstein, 378 U.S. 577 (1964) (per curiam); Manual
Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959)
(statute unconstitutional for complete lack of scienter); Sunshine Book Co. v. Summer-
field, 355 U.S. 372 (1958) (per curiam); One, Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371 (1958) (per
curiam); Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 355 U.S. 35 (1957) (per curiam). While
opinions have been rendered in some cases, in none was there an opinion of the court.
"Despite the diversity of opinion in Jacobellis, and in light of the subsequent per
curiams, see note 67 supra, there seems to be a solid five-four majority in support of the
judgment embraced in the Brennan-Goldberg opinion. Presumably Justices Black and
Douglas will vote consistently to grant certiorari and for reversal, due to their more
extreme position. Mr. Justice Stewart, in his belief that obscenity prosecution should
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be limited to hard-core pornography, intends to see the material in order to judge
whether it is hard-core pornography. He would therefore vote to grant certiorari
and perform something more than a sufficient evidence test. In Tralins v. Gerstein
and Grove Press, Inc. v. Gerstein, supra note 67, he voted to reverse. Hence, even with
the loss of Mr. Justice White to the dissenters in those two cases, there appears to be
a majority of five Justices which will continue to reverse in the post-Roth manner.
See Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the
First Amendment," 1964 Sup. Cr. Rxy. 191, 217-18, wherein it is argued that since New
York Times Co., v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), "no matter how speech is classified,
there must still be First Amendment consideration and review. No category of speech
is any longer beneath the protection of the First Amendment .... [Obscenity] 'can
claim no talismatic immunity from constitutional limitations."'
